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Water policies throughout the world often avoid market-
determined allocations. In this article, we focus on case
studies ofIsrael and California. Despite major cultural
andpolitical differences, it is found that water is heavily
controlled through similar administrative mechanisms in
both areas. Moreover, in both cases, these controls have
ledto inefficientallocation schemesfavoringagricultureat
the expenseofotheruses. This article examines the institu-
tionalfactors that have led to such·controls, and argues
that adopting a new regulatoryframework similar to that
used to regulate electricity can still meet social concerns
while dramatically improving economic efficiency.
Throughout history and in many parts ofthe world, water
has been treated differently from other·COUllllodities. In
fact, there are many that argue that water is not a com-
modity, but is special because ofthe role itplays in human
survival and development. Dry areas thathave been able to
gain access to water have turned from deserts to gardens,
while areas that have been deprived of water become
wastelands.
Because ofwater's importance to dry regions, access to
wateristypicallyamatterofpublic policy. As suggestedby
the old saying in the West, "whiskey is for drinking; water
is for fighting over," allocation ofthe resource tends to be
the result of contentious historical experience. Develop-
ment of water tends to be the outcome of publicly spon-
sored efforts aimed at achieving larger social aims, and
allocation ofthat resource is closely monitored.
It .is the heavy restrictions placed on the allocation of
water that make the resource so unusual, particularly in
market-driven economies. Other resources have been de-
veloped in partnership with the government, and the gov-
ernment often has a say in how that resource is used. But,
in mostcases, government is concernedwith initial alloca-
tions, and allows subsequent trading to occur to achieve
improved outcomes for the recipients. Inthe case ofwater,
such trading is restricted to amuch greater extent.
This unusual control over allocation and use is espe-
cially apparent when viewed across cultures. In this article
we examine water allocation and use in two very different
political and cultural systems-Israel and California-
which, despite major differences in nearly all other social
and economic institutions, have remarkably similar pol-
icies for allocating water. Furthermore, population pres-
sures have increased sharply in bothofthese areas, placing
increasing stress on available water supplies. Additional
insights, therefore, are possible by viewing how the two
regions are coping with the growing shortages.
While the focus is on these two very different regions,
the lessons are morebroadlyapplicable. Forexample, most
parts ofthe western United States face similar challenges
with water allocation. Details ofwater administration vary
by region, however, putting an exhaustive evaluation ofall
approaches to water allocation beyond the scope of this
paper. Moreover, although there are some differences in
practice-Jorexample, Colorado allows some trading in a
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rights in some cases, making itpossible to buy agricultural
land and transfer the water to the cities-for most dry
regions, the same basic problems dominate.
This article compares water policy in Israel andCalifor-
niato the U.S. allocation policyofelectricity, anothergood
characterized by increasing returns to scale. As discussed
in section II, water shares many physical characteris-
tics with electricity, particularly in the infrastructure and
institutions· needed to develop and get the product to
consumers.
The major finding is that water policy differs from
electricity policy in one key respect: After the initial
allocation, water is much more controlled than electricity,
with significant limitations on trading. Thus, it is allocated
by quantity rationing. Electricity allocation, on the other
. hand, has some aspects of social allocation, but, ulti-
mately, prices are used to ration demand (evenifthey are
subsidized prices for some users).
Because of this administrative control, we argue that
high efficiency costs are observed in the water delivery
systems of the two regions-costs that are directly at-
tributed to the restrictions on trading. In both regions,
water is used in ways that force the development of ineffi-
cient, high-cost alternatives.
The purpose ofsuch public micromanagement is appar-
ently to control more fully the pattern ofeconomic devel-
opmentin the region. Reform efforts in the two regions
provide a useful contrast in this respect. In California,
economic forces have become increasingly important in
pushing for water allocation reform. Major efforts are
underway to change the allocation mechanism to increase
the role of market forces-that is, to allow trading. And
one factor contributing to the success ofthose efforts is the
declining relative importance of the state's primary water
user-agriculture-'--and the growing political and eco-
nomic power of cities and industries. In Israel, however,
such reform efforts remain weak, and the government's
need to control the use ofwater-forstrategic and political
purposes-continues to dominate the economic factors
that are pushing for reform.
This article is organized as follows. Section I presents
institutional details on current water allocation systems in
the two regions, including both the physical structure of
the water delivery systems and the economic and political
infrastructures used to allocate the water. Section II com-
pares those allocation mechanisms to the relatively more
market-oriented mechanisrns used to allocate electricity in
the United States. We look at the reasons for government
involvement in developing and allocating a resource like
water, and we examine the extentto which the regulation of
electric utilities provides a viable alternative model for
water allocation. Section III discusses the costs of not
using an electric utility-style allocation scheme, pointing
out the inefficiencies resulting from the implicit ban on
exchange. Section IV discusses traditional responses to
rising shortages, and indicates the problems that have
arisen in continuing "business as usual" in the two re-
gions' water policies. Section V discusses some of the
reform efforts underway in California, and Section VI
presents conclusions.
I. WATER INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY
IN CALIFORNIA AND ISRAEL
Californiaand Israel share anumberofsimilarities in water
policy, despite other cultural and economic differences.
Both have large semi-arid areas, mountain ranges, and
mild, wet winters (except in extreme elevations) combined
with dry rainless summers. Both regions experience rain-
fall that is concentrated in the north, and which then must
be transported and pumped to drier southernregions. Both
use extensive networks ofaqueducts, pipelines, and pump-
ing stations, and both have extensive experience with
"high-tech" irrigation technology and biogenetic engi-
neering in agriculture. Moreover, despite very different
politicalcultures, both regions rely extensively on political
and not economic policies for water allocation.
Israel
In an average year, Israel draws 1.2 to 1.3 million acre feet
(MAP) of fresh water; 60 to 75 percent is consumed by
agriculture (depending on supply conditions each year)
and the residual goes to urban and industrial consumers.
This wateris obtainedfrom several sources. The main body
offresh water in Israel is the Kinneret, or Sea ofGalilee,
which provides abouthalfofthe total supplies. Itis located
in the Jordan rift and sits well below sea level. This means
that expensive pumping and transport is required to move
water from the Sea to the country's farming areas, most of
which are above sealevel. The Seais fed by theJordanriver
and also empties into the same Jordan river, which then
flows south into the Dead Sea. The latter is even further
below sea level; indeed, it is the lowest point on earth and
resembles somewhat California's Mono Lake. Water is
conveyed from the Jordan River to the southern part of
Israel through the National Water Carrier (a pipeline and
aqueduct system), which was completed in 1964.
In addition to the Jordan river and the Sea of Galilee,
there are two large underground aquifers, the Coastal and
the Mountain aquifers, the latter encompassing central
Israel and much ofthe West Bank. Water drawn from these
sources accounts for the bulk ofthe remaining supplies. A
variety of wells, oases, and dams capture water from44 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
additional sources, but provide relatively small quantities.
Israel also makes considerable use of recycled waste
water, particularly for irrigation purposes, as well as some
brackishwater from wells nearthe seacoastand nearEilat.
Desalination ofsea water has been used only on a limited
orexperimental basis.
Proposals for new sources of water that have been
considered include large-scaledesalination, water imports
from Turkey, and even a canal from the Mediterranean to
the Dead Sea, that would allow complete diversion ofthe
Jordan river for commercial purposes.. Other possibilities
includenew groundwaterdiscoveries, anddiversions from
theLitaniRiver (WolfandRoss 1992). In all ofthese cases,
however, the projects may not be commercially viable and
there are fears thatthey couldcauseextensive environmen-
tal damage. 1
Under Israeli law, water is a nationalized public good.
As specified in the 1959 Water Law, all water is the
property of the state, including waste, sewer, and runoff
water that can be commercially used. An owner of land
does not own water under the land, and there are no
riparian rights.2 This legal status ofwater continues prac-
tices incorporated into the Fundamental Law defining the
rules of government in 1949, and those embedded in
the British Mandatory laws. The 1959 law essentially
perpetuated the then-existing water allocation pattern,
with water set aside for planned future settlements and
activities. Water is supplied by Mekorot, Ltd., a public
corporation that pumps and supplies about 60 percent of
the nation's water, and by small private suppliers.
The Minister of Agriculture is the supreme statutory
authority charged with formulation of water policy-
including consumption, pricing, and allocation-subject
to oversight by a Knesset water committee that must
approve water pricing changes. The Minister appoints the
Water Commissioner and an advisory Water Commission,
and also the directors ofother public sector agencies that
play a role in water development, pricing, and supply. 3
Some analysts have argued that this arrangement has
fostered an automatic conflict of interest in water alloca-
1. According to a feasibility study by the Israeli government in 1983,
additional use ofwater from the Dead Seacould cause minerals to cake
onthe surface. (The Dead Seahas saltconcentrations55 times that ofthe
Pacific Ocean.) In addition to environmental damage, they concluded
that such efforts would damage the tourist trade and mineral extraction
processes in the vicinity.
2. Riparian rights are based on English law, and grant a landowner the
rightto use water thatpasses through his orherproperty. Inmost Middle
East countries, mineral and water rights under one's land belong to the
state.
3. At the present time, the powers of the water committee are being
transferred to the Finance Committee of the Knesset.
tion. Because the natural tendency of the Ministry of
Agriculture is to work as an advocate on behalf of farm
interests, water policies also tend to be formed by agri-
cultural interest groups (Galnoor 1978). In part because of
this tendency, water policy in recent drought years has
allowed substantial over-consumption ofwater supplies by
agriculture, even though these actions have polluted and
damaged the structure ofthe underground aquifers.
Even when cuts are made in supplies, the policies
appear to be crafted with farm welfare in mind. For
example, in 1991, theMinisterofAgriculture implemented
across-the-board cuts of 25 percent in agricultural water
allocations since the Sea of Galilee's surface level had
dropped below its "red line," a somewhat arbitrary level
selected as the minimum allowable level.4 Farmers whose
allocations were cut were eligible for compensation from
taxpayers for lost revenues that would have been generated
with the water.
In Israel, water allocations tend to be political. Histor-
ical allocation is one guiding principle, with water users
generally able to receive the same allotmentinfuture years
if they use the supplies they are granted in the current
period. Apportionment of additional water often takes
place subject to political pressure.
Once granted, water allocations in Israel are extremely
inflexible. Farmers are allocated water to grow specific
crops. If a farmer wants to change his crop mix, he must
apply to the Ministry for permission to apply the water to
that different crop. Allotted water not used cannot be
sold-itis explicitly illegal to sell water or water rights in
Israel. Violators are subjectto criminalprosecution. More-
over, farmers who temporarily consume less than theirfull
allotments may find their future allotments cut in subse-
quent years, creating theincentivefor farmers to use all of
their allocation ofwater to preserve future deliveries, even
ifthe use is wasteful. Finally, a farmer who sells his land
cannot sell his water allotment with.the land, and must
include a clause in the contract where the buyer attests to
having been forewarned ofthis.
California
WaterallocationinCaliforniais similarto thatinIsrael. On
average, 80 to 85 percent ofnet water consumption occurs
in the agricultural sector. Urbanusers consume 10 percent,
with the residual allocated to industry.
California has one of the most intricate water supply
systems in the world. Most of the rainfall and snow
4. Despite its designation as a minimum, the Ministry approved even
further pumping below the "red line" in 1990 and 1991 because oflow
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accumulate in the northern and eastern parts ofthe state,
while most ofthe population is in the western and south-
ern, semi-arid regions. A series of dams and reservoirs
capture and store water in the Sierra Nevada and the
northern part of the state for transport in a vast system of
canals and aqueducts to the populated coastal and central
agricultural regions.
California's water is developedandsuppliedby avariety
of different agents. The two largest projects, the Central
Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP),
provide 27.5 percent ofthe net water supplied in the state
inanaverage year. TheCVPwas developed andis operated
by the federal government, while the SWP was developed
and is operated by the state. The two systems provided 7.0
and 2.4 MAP ofwater, respectively, in 1985, the last year
ofrelatively normal supplies.
In addition· to those projects, individual cities have
developed reservoirs and delivery systems, such as the
Hetch Hetchy reservoir for San Francisco and the Lake
Cachuma and Gibralter reservoirs for Santa Barbara. Los
Angeles also has aggressively redirected water from other
sources. Los Angeles receives water from the Owens
Valley and MonoLakethroughthe Los Angeles Aqueduct,
as well as some water from the Colorado River. Recent
court decisions, however, have reduced future deliveries
from these sources. Total withdrawals from the Colorado
Riverwere around 5 MAFin1985; that totalisexpected to
drop to4.2 MAF by 2010.
Finally, complementing these surface watersources is an
extensive supply of ground water in aquifers. In 1985,
sustainable ground water supplies were estimated to be
around 6 MAF of the state's total of 32.2 MAP. An
additional 2 MAF was overdrafted in that year, to yield
total supplies of34.2 MAE During drought years, ground
wateris drawn more heavily, smoothing supplies from year
to year. .
Several new sources ofsupply are under consideration.
According to the California Department of Water Re-
sources (Department of Water Resources 1987), an addi-
tionall.4 MAF will be needed by the year 2010 to meet
existing and projected needs ofan additional 6.5 million
people, Most ofthat gain depends on further development
ofthe state and federal water systems, including the Kern
water bank, construction ofthe Auburn dam, and comple-
tion of Los Banos. Grandes reservoir. Other potential
sources include further conservation efforts, development
ofwaste water re-use, and desalination plants.
California's water resources are administered by a large
number of overlapping state and federal agencies. CVP
water is federally administered by the US. Bureau of
Reclamation, with water delivered to CVP contractors.
SWP water is administered by the state. The state's Water
Resources Control Board is the agency most directly in-
volved in determining possible shifts ofwater from one
user to another, but the Department of Fish and Wildlife
and the federal Environmental Protection Agency, among
others, also have criticalinputintothe process. Atthe local
level, water districts have the power to reallocate water
within a district and often have veto power over shipments
out ofthe district.
Rights are an accumulation of historical precedents.
Riparian rights, establishing the right to use water that
passes through one's land, apply to many of the water
resources claimed early in California's development. Ap-
propriative rights apply to most ofthe state's water, al-
thoughtherules governing those rights differdepending on
the date granted. Appropriative rights allow the user to
divert water for "beneficial use," with rights sequentially
based on when the right was granted. These rights.were
designed to protect early developers located downstream
from losing water because of newer upstream diversions.
As in Israel, however, rights do not include automatic
ownership. Water is deemed a public good owned by the
people of the state. The "Public Trust Doctrine" is fre-
quently citedby the courts in waterdisputes. With roots in
Roman law, the doctrine ofpublic trust holds that certain
resources are the property of all. In a 1983 decision
(National Audubon Society vs. Superior Court), the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the state has a duty to
consider public trust values before it approves water rights
applicationsor adjustments. This doctrine has been used
most recently to guarantee water for in-stream, environ-
mental uses.
Appropriative rights allow users to apply the water for
beneficial purposes, but do not allow the rights holders to
treat the resource as an asset. Thus, most water supplies
cannot be sold or traded to other users without explicit
approval ofa variety ofagencies, including the local water
district, the Bureau of Reclamation, the state Water Re-
source Control Board, and possibly the EPA, US. Depart-
ment ofFish and Game, and the state's DepartmentofFish
and Wildlife. Moreover, water that is not used by a rights
holdermay be interpreted as surplus waterthatis not bene-
ficially used. Like Israel, therefore, California's incentives
are structuredto "useit or lose it," withusers thatuse less
than their full allotment potentially losing that surplus in
future years.5
5. Recent examples of this interpretation have emerged in California,
Some rice farmers that idled fields and sold their water to the state's
Emergency Water Bank in 1991 are reporting efforts by the state to
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n. Is WATER SPECIAL?
Asdiscussedabove, waterallocationis highly controlledin
Israel and California. Water is allocated according to
historical precedent, with modifications to reflect changes
in available supplies or competing uses made by admin-
istrative fiat. Indroughtyears, for example, some users are
given only partial allotments, with cutbacks either across
the board or applied sequentially across classes of users.
Economicforces are largely ignored. Watertransfers are
difficult, even whenthey are arrangedto the mutual benefit
of both parties. Prices do not change to reflect growing
scarcity, and hence, prices are not used asa tool to
encourageconservation or as amechanismto evaluate new
infrastructures.6 Differences in prices across regions and
users are notusedas signals to encouragetransfers ofwater
from low-priced to high-priced regions. In fact, those
facing limited supplies are encouraged to develop new
(usually higher cost) sources, rather than to purchase
supplies from existing users, even when both parties could
gain from the exchange.7
This treatmentofwater, which differs significantlyfrom
the way other resources are allocated in market-oriented
economies, is typicallyjustified on the grounds that water
is special. In this section, we examine two related is-
sues. First, we discuss the reasons that government typ-
ically intervenes in water delivery, drawing parallels with
other regulated natural monopolies-particularly elec-
tricity. Second, we examine the differences between the
allocation ofwater and ofelectricity and identify the root
difference between regulation ofthose industries.
Argumentsfor a Governmental Role
in Water Delivery
Several arguments are put·forth in favor of involving
government in the allocation ofwaterindry regions. Three
issues typically are cited: the cost structure of water
investments, other noneconomic public policy goals, such
6. In fact, prices are used in what appears to be a punitive fashion by
manywaterdistricts. Duringthe heightofthe droughtin California, for
example, moral suasion (rather than price increases) and threats of
restricted service caused urban users to reduce consumption sharply.
Waterdistricts then were faced withrevenue shortfalls, since prices had
not adjusted. They then had to raise rates to consumers. Thus, water
districts wereinthe awkwardpositionofpenalizingconsumersfordoing
what the water districts had requested. Obviously, if the districts had
instead used higher prices to discourage water consumption, this
problem would have been avoided.
7. Interestingly, while lack of transfers often forces urban areas to
consider more exotic technologies, pricing policies make those in-
vestments appear unreasonable. For example, Israel recently·decided
as encouraging migration and directing land use deci-
sions, andconcerns aboutequityandeconomic disruptions
("third party effects"). As we argue, however, each of
these arguments also could be-and is-applied to elec-
tricity allocation, and the more successful experience of
that industry in adjusting to growing and competing needs
appears to offerauseful guideline to improving the current
system.
Water Investment Costs. Public investmentin new water
facilities often is justified on the grounds of increasing
returns to scale. Typically, the infrastructures needed to
store and deliver new water supplies-dams, pumps, and
canals-are governed by decreasing marginal cost struc-
tures. Slightly increasing the size ofa dam or a canal can
cause a large increase in capabilities since, in general,
volume does not increase linearly with increasedinvest-
ment, but roughly geometrically. Consequently, marginal
costs tend to fall with increasing project size up to some
point.
Often the point of minimum marginal.cost requires an
investment too large for an individual or group ofindivid-
uals to coordinate.8 In those cases; the governmentoften is
askedto step in on behalfofits constituents.9 For example,
after considerable lobbying, the California Legislature
authorized the Central Valley Project as a state water
project in 1933, which the federal government eventually
built and operated. The other major water projects in
California also are the result of state or local government
efforts, including the SWP.
againsta major water resource development project inthe southern port
city ofEilatbecause it was not viable at current water prices. However,
since prices often are based on pumping and transportation costs, and
ignore the social opportunity costs and scarcity value ofthe resource,
those prices may understate the value of a new facility. Consequently,
this project rnight have been viable with proper pricing.
8. According to Reisner and Bates (1990), the federal governmenttried
to encourage private water development in the nineteenth century by
offering free or highly subsidized land to those that would undertake
suchdevelopment. However, becauseofthelargecostsinvolved, private
efforts were largely unsuccessful. "At the eighth National Irrigation
Congress in 1898, one speaker compared the western landscape to a
graveyard, littered by the 'crushed and mangled skeletons of defunct
irrigation companies . . . which suddenly disappeared at the end of
brief careers, leaving only a few defaulted obligations to indicate the
route by which they departed'" (p. 13).
9. Work by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Olson (1982) has argued
that the process by which projects such as these are developed can be
explained by special interest group models. Concentrated single-issue
interest groups often are able to obtain political support and suffiCient
votes to pass legislation favorable to that group because the costs
.imposed on the non-beneficiaries are spread thin, making political
opposition weak. The beneficiaries ofnew water projects typically are
relatively concentrated. In California, for example, the CVP deliversSCHMIDT AND PLAUT/WATER POLICY IN CALIFORNIA AND ISRAEL 47
In Israel, the government also has been the principal
agent ofwater development. Galnoor (1978, p.343) char-
acterized the rationale for government involvement as
follows:
Divergencesbetweenthe private side andthe public side
of water costs andlor benefits, as well as the need for
high initial investments and the characteristics of a
natural monopoly, contribute to the necessity of some
form ofpublic intervention in the managementofwater
resources. In Israel, government intervention is also
required because water is a partofthe infrastructure for
(a) the ideologyofnationbuilding basedonfarming and
new settlements and (b) economic development.
TheIsraeli government, therefore, has taken upon itself
the responsibility for planning, constructing, and main-
taining new facilities. Through 1970, gross investment in
waterprojects by the government was estimatedto be equal
to between 3 and5percentoftotal gross capital investment
in the country. Costs of new supplies were so high that
expansion plansinvolvingthe United States as a partnerin
a joint venture to build large desalination plants were
developed in themid-1960s, although the plans were never
implemented (Tahal 1972).
DevelopmentTool. A second motivation for government
control over water allocation is water's power as a tool to
influence migration and land use. In Israel and the western
United States, pro-growth forces were very strong during
the periods of water development. Often one of the most
powerful inducements to potential migrants was access to
cheap land in peripheral areas. In much ofCalifornia and
Israel, the available peripheral land was not particularly
attractive to settlers unless water could be provided to
irrigate crops. Thus, in both regions, policies often were
designed to create large supplies of dependable water for
agricultural purposes. 10
In Israel, strong priority was given to encouraging
immigration and population dispersal. Development of
available agricultural land has been an important goal
(Galnoor 1987, p. 345):
water primarily to agricultural users. Similarly, in Israel, farmers
consume three-fourths of the total supply. The water is subsidized by
. other sectors ofthe economy, which bear the residual cost ofoperating
and constructing supply facilities. Additional federal projects continue
to be proposed and constructed, where the costs are borne nationally
and the benefits are concentrated in specific regions and groups of
consumers. Thus, accordingto thistheory, projectscanbeapproved that
provide subsidized water for some users that would be prohibitively
expensive to the beneficiaries ifthey were developed privately by those
beneficiaries.
10. AccordingtoReisnerandBates(1990), partofTheodoreRoosevelt's
motivation for developing water projects in the west was to build up
"America's weak western flank" (p. 14).
In the context of Zionist ideological objectives, water
has never been regarded as merely another economic
resource, but as a prerequisite to efforts to create a new
society in the (cultivated and redeveloped) Land of
Israel. The selection of one water project over another
was not determined on the basis of relative economic
returns. This ideology stressed a "productive occupa-
tional pyramid" based mainly on farming in the collec-
tive Kibbutzim and in the smallholders' communal
settlements.
As discussed by Plaut (1992, p. 16), Israeli policy also has
soughttoencourageactivecultivationandoccupationofits
lands for national security reasons:
There is an ancient and broad consensus in Israel that
survival ofthe state requires"settlement" ofthe land by
Jews. In many cases, "settlement" is taken to mean
farming. The origins ofthe doctrine go back to the early
phases oftheZionistmovement, when the boundaries of
"settlement" were believed to establish the geographic-
political blueprint for a later state.
Once Israel came into being, its borders were deter-
mined .by either diplomacy or force of arms, but no
longer by farm settlement. Nevertheless, the belief that
land settlement provides political and strategic control
of territory has survived. It is closely linked with the
ideological consensus in favor of population dispersal
policies.
Initially, dispersal of farm settlements along frontiers
played a strategic role, making border patrol and sur-
veillance easier. Later, it was argued that these settle-
ments couldprovide supportandservices for army units
stationed near the frontiers. After 1967, agricultural
settlements were established in the Territories for the
express purpose of creating political "facts" and new
strategic realities. In any case, it is widely believed that
an absence of Jewish settlement in .any part of the
country may lead to loss ofthat region through interna-
tional pressure andlor Arab insurgency.
More recently in California, water policy has been used
in the reverse direction-preventing growth. Barriers are
raised to converting agricultural wateruse to urban use, in
partto preventconversionofagricultural landtourbanand
industrial purposes. Opposition to water markets in Cali-
fornia's Central Valley, for example, is driven by fears that
water markets would encourage the transition away from
agriculture and bring major changes in the industrial and
social fabric of the valley communities. In other cases,
suchasin SantaBarbara, thecitycouncilchosein theearly
1970s not to hook up to the State Water Project, arguing
thataccess to additional sources ofwaterwould allow more48 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
people to move to the area and create excessive growth.ll
Fairness. Athirdargumentfor government allocationof
water is concern over fairness and the potential costs
of changing existing allocations. Fairness issues arise
whenever reforms are considered. Since current policies
explicitly state that water is a public good, held in trustby
the State and is not owned by any individual, any change
whereby an individual gainedlegal title to the waterwould
involve a change in the distribution ofwealth and income.
In such cases, it becomes possible to ask whether current
subsidized water recipients "should be" entitled to those
resources, or whether another allocation is more fair.
Fairness also appears in the debate because offears that
pricing the resource would make water unavailable or too
costly to low-income persons and farmers. Some interest
groups voice concerns thatmarketprices wouldbetoohigh
for many consumers, so only the wealthy would be able to
afford the resource.
More generally, pricing policies of many projects ex-
plicitlyrecognizeothersocial goals relating to fairness. For
example, prices ofCVPwaterare heavily subsidized. Most
contracts called for fees thatoften Vlere designed to pay the
nominal cost ofthe construction over time. While initially
designed as a lO-year repayment period, most Bureau of
Reclamation projects eventually extended terms for as
much as 80 years. Moreover, interest costs, under the
Reclamation Act of 1902, were not charged (Reisner and
Bates 1990).
In Israel, water "doctrine" has always been based on
pricing formulas that reflect the farmer's "ability to pay"
andnotthe scarcityvalueofwater as aresource. Underthis
doctrine, a drought that reduced a farmer's ability to pay
should produce lower water prices, not higher prices to
farmers, whereas in a market system the price would rise
due to the reduction in supply. Hence, "fairness" to farm-
ers, rather than efficientuse ofthe water, appears to be the
predominant sentiment guiding water policy in Israel.
A related issue involves potential disruptions that any
change in allocation mightcreate, or "thirdparty effects."
Policymakers predict that the use ofwater markets would
decimate agriculture and the agricultural communities by
encouraging farmers to sell all of their supplies (causing
large third party effects on other rural businesses). Large
differentials inprices betweencities and agricultural water
districts are taken as evidence that markets would lead to
largediversions betweenfarms and cities, withwatercosts
11. This policy has changed as a result ofthe recent drought. Extreme
reductions imposed on homeowners ledto political pressureto add new
supplies. Santa Barbara did connect a small pipeline to southern
California in 1991 to purchase water from the Metropolitan Water
District, and it is exploring desalination options.
pricing agriculture out ofwater. Andexperience in Owens
Valley, where Los Angeles acquired rights to water from
the valley and transferred it to the city atthe expenseofthe
local economy, is frequently cited as a warning for the po-
tentially negative effects of allowing transfers.
Water vs. Electricity
While these arguments have been powerful justifications
for current allocation policies-and may argue for some
governmental involvement in the system-they are not
unique to water. In fact, these same arguments can be
applied to electricity and other utilities, and yet those
industries appear to be more adaptable and efficient than
the water delivery system. In many instances, water ap-
pears to share more similarities than dissimilarities·with
electricity; the major exception is the way it is controlled
after the initial allocation.
Natural Monopoly. Water and electricity have similar
physical and technical characteristics. Indeed, they often
are joint products oflarge dams constru9ted along rivers.
Water and electricity both fioVJ in complicated grids over
long distances, and are delivered to municipal customers
through a centralized utility. Technical characteristics are
similar: Storage (dams and reservoirs), transportation (ca-
nals and pipelines), and distribution networks all exhibit
economies ofscale that lend themselves to the creationof
natural monopolies. Marginalcosts tendto fall overalarge
range, often making it inefficient to promote competition
in many parts ofthe system.
Butinthe caseofelectricity, considerableworkhas gone
into designing regulations that maximize the efficiency of
the utility while recognizing these scale economies. Util-
ities thatbuildgenerating plants are allowedto addcosts of
approved facilities into the rate base, and owners of the
utilities are granted a rate ofreturn on that capital.
Nonetheless, while highly regulated, electricitydemand
is rationed by price-exceptin the rare instance ofpower
failures and shortages. Users are charged in ways to
generate the necessary rate ofreturn, cost ofmaintaining
thefacilities, andcostsofinputs. Pricing schemestypically
rely on average cost of delivery. Moreover, reforms are
constantly being evaluated. Forexample, time-of-day pric-
ing has beentested in several sites to matchmarginal costs
more closely to prices charged for the resource. 12
12. The key advantage ofusing prices with subsidies to ration demand,
as opposed to direct allocation,is that ina pricing environmenttrading
occurs. Even though a system with subsidies results in a distorted use
pattern, it is still the case that recipients ofthe resource balance their
valuation ofthe water against that ofall other potential users. In direct
quantity rationing without trading, mutually welfare-enhancing im-
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Major reforms also have been suggested (and elements
tested) to introduce more market forces into electricity
distribution. As reviewed by Schmidt (1987), increasing
interlinkages between power grids have made bulk power
sales among utilities at market prices a least-cost mecha-
nism to avoid unnecessary construction of costly new
facilities. Otherparts ofthe system also have the potential
for injecting additional market forces to improve the oper-
ating efficiency of the system-~
In many ways, the regulatory structure used for elec-
tricity appears applicable to allocating water. A regulated
monopoly couldbe granted to the producers, transmitters,
and distributors of the water. In principle, rate of return
compensation could be arranged (paid to the government
in the case of state or federal projects), with the price to
consumers ultimately serving to ration supplies among
consumers. Moreover, likebulkpower, watercouldbe sold
among primary owners of water at market prices, and
moved (analogous to "wheeling" in the electric utility
industry) along the canal network to its final destination.
Development Tool. Water allocation often is intended to
guide economic development. Prices are established to
subsidizeandencourageuseinparticularareas. The power
ofwater has been readily apparent in both California and
Israel.
Electricity has been used for similar purposes. The
Tennessee Valley Authority was created in the United
States to generate low-cost power to a large underdevel-
oped rural area. Similarly, the Rural Electrification pro-
gram has the objective ofbringing low-cost power to rural
areas to help speed development in those areas.
Electricity, like water, is viewed by many governments
as one ofthe basic infrastructure ingredients necessary to
promote economic growth. Encouraging access to elec-
tricity networks has been a central part ofmany economic
development programs. Thus, the electricity model of
allocation appears rich enough to encompass these addi-
tional goals ofwater development.
Fairness. Concerns about social equity often work
through water pricing policies. Prices for water generally
are tied to historical construction costs-costs that are
typically well below the economic value ofthe resource. 13
In Israel, even this tenuous link to construction costs
is missing. The Water Law requires that "in spite of
differential costs, water prices in the various regions be
13. A report by the Western Governor's Association (1987, p. iii)
concluded: "The structure of the West's water system at federal,
state,'and local levels was designed to promote economic development
through assuring a secure supply ofwater and to protect property rights
in water once they were established. Laws, policies, and practices are
largely silent on increasing efficiency ofuse."
equalized. In practice, water charges have been relatively
uniform and quite often nominal" (Sadan and Ben-Zvi
1987, p. 3).
In electricity allocation, similar goals exist and are
accommodated through pricing policies. The same con-
cerns often are voiced about low-income consumers. In
many states, electric utilities are prohibited from cutting
off service to low-income consumers during the winter if
they are unable to pay_ Similarly, lifeline rates are offered to
low-income, elderly, and handicapped individuals to as~
sure their access to the resource. Finally, prices charged to
industrial, commercial, and residential consumers are
allowed to be structured in different ways to encourage
certain uses.
Inperiodsoftemporary shortages, electricitypolicy also
is designed to recognize social objectives. Since prices
cannot be instantly adjusted and communicated to users,
temporary surges indemandaremetby graduatedcutbacks
to particular users. Heavy industrial users are cut back
first, with critical needs (forexample, hospitals) the last to
be curtailed. Contingency plans for "brown-outs" and
similar emergencies are established by utilities and ap-
proved by regulators to be consistent with social policy;
ill. IMPLICATIONS OF TRADING
Water policy and electricity policy, therefore, share many
ofthe same objectives and characteristics. Both often rely
on government investment policies, seek to direct the
pattern of economic development, and seek to redress
socialinequitiesby designing pricingandaccesspoliciesto
protect certain interests.
The key institutional difference between water and elec-
tricity results from the assignment ofownership rights. In
the case ofelectricity, the units are clearly owned by some
entity, and that entity has the righttodistributeunits to any
customer or other utility; Even in the case of a publicly
constructed facility, such as the Tennessee Valley Au-
thorityorBonnevillePowerAdministration, apublicentity
has clear ownership of the electricity, which it sells to
utilities-sometimes subsidized, and sometimes accord-
ing to allocation formulas. Butthere is no requirementthat
the receiving party must use that electricity, and thereby
prevent the utility from transferring the power elsewhere.
Inthe caseofwater, transferabilityis severely restricted.
As noted earlier, allocations are determined adminis-
tratively, for the most part, and those allocations then are
fixed. Contractors must use the water, or lose the rights
to it.
Consider how such a policy would work in the elec-
tricityindustry; Customers wouldreceive agivensupply of
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that electricity, they would forfeit future rights to that
resource. Such a system would leadto inefficientoptimiz-
ing .behavior on the part of consumers similar to that
observedinthe former Sovietbloc. InPoland, for example,
heat was supplied at very low cost at specified times. The
incentives builtinto the system, therefore, led to a practice
of regulating temperatures by opening windows, rather
than adjusting heat consumption. In other words, the
incentives win lead consumers to use all orthe subsidized
electricity made available, since the alternative is to lose
access to the power in the future.
Theregulation applied to electric utilities demonstrates
the potential to separate efficiency concerns-how the
resource is used-fromequity concerns. This separability
is well-developed in the economics literature. This latter
point is attributed to Coase (1960), who examined the
importance ofinitial endowments in determining the final
consumption distribution ofa given resource. He demon-
strated that iftrading were allowed and transactions costs
were small, the final allocation of a resource would.be
efficientregardlessoftheinitialdistributionofrights. This
efficiency would be achieved through trading among po-
tential consumers until the resource was finally used in its
highest valued uses.
The "Coase Theorem" predicts that if trading were
allowed, the assignment of ownership rights to water
wouldhave littleeffecton how itultimately would beused
(although that outcome could be considerably different
from the current mix of production resulting from ineffi-
cient allocation of the resource). Whether farmers were
granted ownership and allowed to sell to cities, or vice
versa, the ultimate outcome in water use would be approx-
imately the same. Clearly, wealth would be distributed
differently under the two cases, but the Coase theorem
argues that such ownership assignment only affects how
the final basket ofgoods is distributed among consumers,
notwhatorhow muchis inthe basket.14Thus, itispossible
to allocate rights in the interestofboostingequity, with the
recognition that trading will promote efficient use of the
resource.
In the case of electricity, initial allocations often are
granted with redistribution as a goal, and limits are placed
ontrading toensure that those goals are notcircumvented.
Forinstance, utilities can sell trade surplus power, butthey
14. Some researchers have disputed this claim, arguing that different
initial assignments ofrights would lead to different final consumption
bundles. In particular, if there is a difference between the amount a
farmer would pay to get a unit ofwater ("willingness to pay") and the
amountshe wouldaccepttosellaunitto anotherperson("willingness to
accept compensation"), the outcome would depend on whether she had
the initial right to the resource or whether she had to purchase that right
from another.
mustfirst satisfy local demand. However, utilities also have
incentives to make local demand more efficient by sub-
sidizing insulation and energy conservation efforts.
In the case ofwater, similar limitations could be put in
place. Butifthewater districts had ownership rights to the
water, they wouldhave more incentives to encourage water
conservation to make additional water available to sell
outside the district.
Tne principal benefit or assigning ownership rights to
water is to permit exchange. After choosing an allocation
scheme that satisfies desires.for fairness, individuals can
collectively bemade betteroffby allowing them to engage
in mutually beneficial trade. Even with regulatory restric-
tions in place to favor particular uses, the ability to trade
encourages all parties to recognize the opportunity. cost
embedded in any given use ofthe water.
The cost of not allowing trading is well-documented
(Reisner and Bates 1990, Schmidt and Cannon 1991).
Agricultural water is heavily subsidized in California,
with the price of water to urban users on the order of 10
to.20 times that ofmost agricultural users-even account-
ing for differences in transportation costs and processing
facilities.
These apparent inefficiencies are illustrated by use
patterns in both regions. In Israel, cotton uses a major
portion of the country's water supply. Yet, according to
some analysts, cotton generates negative value-added in
Israel, with the implicit subsidies granted to the sector
exceedingtherevenues from selling the crop. InCalifornia,
40 percent ofthe state's water is used to grow rice, alfalfa,
cotton, and pasture, even though these. crops altogether
account for only 0.2 percent oftotal state income.
Moreover, lack oftransferability has made it necessary
for cities to plan construction ofdesalination plants. Such
plants would yield water at a cost in excess of$2,000 per
acre foot at the same time that water used for some low-
valuecropsis pricedat $8. Sincecosts oftransportationare
on the order of$100per acre foot between many potential
transfer sites, this price differential suggests that both
parties could be made better off by trading. The cities
could forgo constructing expensive new facilities, while
the agricultural sector would be encouraged to increase its
efficiency in wateruse to free up the resourcetosell to the
cities.
Potential gains from trading water have been demon-
strated in several recent cases. A classic example of the
gains to be made from trading is the 1'988 agreement
betweenthe Metropolitan WaterDistrictofSouthernCali-
fornia (MWD) andtheImperialIrrigationDistrict(lID). In
that arrangement, MWD agreed to pay the cost of lining
irrigationditches in the ImperialValley inexchangeforthe
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Interestingly, this case provides strong evidence of the
magnitude of ineffiCiency that resides in the current ad-
ministrative system. Both parties were made betteroffby
the transaction. Indeed, it was sufficiently in MWD's in-
terestto makethe trade thatthey were willingto pay for the
infrastructure improvements as well as pay for the water.
Clearly, lID also gained in the process, since they were
faced with no additional cost, yet gained a windfall profit
from selling water that would otherwise have been lost to
the district. But the incentives in the current system-
including uncertainty about future rights to water-pre-
vented this transaction from occurring automatically. 15
Similarly, intherecentdrought, Californiaexperimented
with an Emergency Water Bank:, where water districts
could sell water to a state body, which then could resell the
water to other districts with shortages. According to work
by Howitt (1991), the effect ofthe Water Bank was to idle
some acreage ofrice and pasture, while permanent crops
and high-value crops continued to receive sufficient water.
Such transfers were voluntary, and resulted in farmers
receiving compensation automatically from urban water
districts.
In sum, the key difference between allocation schemes
for waterandelectricity-andthe cause ofthe highlevel of
inefficiency in wateruse-is the resultoffailure to assign
ownership rights to water users, and hence, to allow
trading ofthose rights. Granting water rights holders the
abilitytoengagein mutuallybeneficial trades wouldputin
place incentives to increaseefficiency in use.
IV. RISING SHORTAGES:
FAILURES OF TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
Drought conditions in the 1980s and early 1990s revealed
serious deficiencies in the water delivery systems of both
Israel and California. Both regions experienced extended
droughts that stressedthe available suppliesbeyondnormal
experience. Large cutbacks in water deliveries to farmers
were required, and extensive conservation and rationing
schemes were imposed on urban and industrial users.
In both cases rains finally arrived and eased short-term
conditions, butthepublicinbothIsraelandCaliforniahave
become increasingly sensitized to the inefficiencies and
costs associated with centrally planned and allocated wa-
ter. Water policy in both regions, therefore, is facing
intensepublic scrutiny, with the publicless willingto leave
decisions to the "experts." Moreover, the droughts also
highlighted the increasing scarcity of existing supplies
15. For a description of the events in this case, see Reisner and Bates
(1990). Whileheraldedas asuccess bythose advocatingincreaseduse of
over the long term, with growing populations likely to
make responses to future droughts even more difficult and
costly. Both Israel and California expect growing popula-
tions, while few new sources of supply are scheduled to
come on line without further investments.
Traditionally, the response to shortages has been to
locate and develop new supplies. California's Department
ofWater Resources, for example, projects the need for 1.4
MAFofnew waterby the year 2010, basedonthe assump-
tion that the needs ofa growing population are metby new
sources, rather than through reallocation ofexisting sup-
plies. Estimates in Israel in the mid-1970s called for a
shortfall ofabout 0.25 MAF developing by 1985, again to
accommodatenew uses, not to reallocateexisting supplies.
Projections of population growth imply that by the early
twenty-first century watermay suffice for urbanusers only,
with no agricultural water in Israel.
The traditional response-to meet growing demand by
adding capacity-has faced resistance in recent years,
however. Three related reasons have combined to make
new facilities increasingly difficult to undertake.
First, the environmental movements in California, and
to alesserextentinIsrael, have challengedadditionalwater
development by focusing attention on the previously ig-
nored environmental consequences of water projects. In
California, current water use patterns have caused wide-
spread damage to the San Francisco Bay Estuary (the
Delta). Agricultural runoff has degraded water quality by
increasing the nitrogen content of the water. Low flow
conditions caused by excessive pumping ofwater through
the Delta to the southern portion ofthe state have caused
periods ofreverse flow, where salt water is pulled into the
Delta. Moreover, periods of low flow have raised water
temperatures in the rivers, a development that has been
linked to a sharp decline in the number of salmon that
spawn in the Sacramento River. Finally, past development
policies have reduced wetlands areas, destroying the hab-
itat ofa wide variety·offish and migratory wildlife.
Changes in operating practices in the Delta, which are
likely to be mandated by the EPA and the federal Depart-
ment of FishandGame, may have a profound impact on
California's watersupply. Currently, over halfofthe state's
fresh water passes through the Delta. Improved environ-
mental quality is likely to result in reduced shipments of
voluntary transfers, this agreement also highlighted the problems with
the currentsystem ofregulation. Rather than happening voluntarily in
response torecognitionofthe mutuallybeneficialtrade possibilities, the
agreement was triggered by alegal challenge by one ofthe farmers and
an order by the State Water Resources Control Board. The process took
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water to the southern portion ofthe state.16As much as 1.1
MAF ofthe state's water may be removed from consump-
tion and applied for environmental purposes.17
In Israel the main ecological policy issue has been the
destruction ofits aquifers. Overconsumptionofwaterfrom
those underground resources has begun to damage the
geological structures ofthe aquifers,threateningto destroy
future water supplies. Moreover, additional use of water
from the Dead ·Sea could cause further environmental
damage to that body of water.
Second, new supplies are expensive. The relatively
inexpensive projects have already come online. Currently,
planners are considering new dams in California (although
with little likelihood of success given environmental op-
position), water banking in ground water basins, and the
development of some new facilities to store water south of
the Delta. But most plans for new supplies also involve
desalination plants that can cost in excess or $2,000 an
acre foot, and waste water treatment facilities that also
yield high-cost water. Other choices involve forced ration-
ing in urban settings, particularly in new construction
(limits on landscaping, plumbing requirements, and so
forth).
Israel faces similar choices, although options are more
limited because of its geography. Desalination plants can
be constructed, but they yield water at very high costs.
Moreover, desalination plants also increase dependence on
oil, which is needed to operate the facilities. Wastewater
treatment facilities arealready used and others are under
consideration to recycle some water, but demand manage-
ment to reduce water use remains the primary tool for
meeting projected shortfalls.18
16. Total shipments through the Delta need not necessarily be affected
by new practices, although the timing of shipments probably will be.
Two alternatives that have been considered are (1) a peripheral canal to
divertwateraroundtheDelta, and(2) storagefacilities southoftheDelta
to bank increased shipments in the wetter winter months to use in the
summermonths when demands on the system are greater. Both projects
face strong political opposition, particularly in the northern part ofthe
state where residents fear that the new facilities would make it possible
for increased transfers from the north to the south at the expense of
consumers and the environment in the north.
17. Congressional bill H.R. 429, signed into law in October1992, sets
aside 800,000 acre feet for environmental purposes from the CVP,
while a proposedruling by the State WaterResources ControlBoard (to
comply with EPA rulings) may take an additional 300,000 acre feet
from other sources.
18. Therehave beenreports that Israel and Jordan currently are consid-
ering a new canal from the Red Seato funnel waterto the DeadSeaand
generate electricity, but this is viewed largely as a political gesture
promoting peace efforts, rather than as a major effort to increase water
supplies.
Water rights are now a major issue in the Israeli-Arab
dialogue. A separate panel is working exclusively on the
issue of water and important issues remain unresolved.
Untilthose issues are resolved, options involving transfers
from outside Israel also are unlikely until Israel's interna-
tional situation changes.
Third, complementing the other two factors, is the fact
that the urban populations in the two regions have become
better educated about water policy trade--offs. Urban users
have been forced to examine the system in light of the
high costs that resulted from rationing during the recent
droughts. As a result of that examination, there is wide-
spread understanding that most wateris applied to agricul-
ture, with much ofit going to field crops that are relatively
low-value crops.
In California, early water politics led to an alliance be-
tween agricultural interests in southern California against
interests in northern California. Most battles for changing
water allocations were between the north and the south.
Recently, though, the alliances have changed. Increasingly,
the politicalconflicthas shiftedto agriculturalversusurban
uses, with citiespointingto the rising relative value created
bywater in industrial uses compared to thatin agriculture.
Similarly in Israel, the political power of the agricultural
interests has found increasing opposition among other
groups in the matter ofwater policy.
These factors have made itincreasingly difficult to meet
growingdemandsforwaterthroughtheadditionofcapacity.
Moreover, the increasedpoliticalpoweroftheenvironmen-
tal groups in California already has forced reallocations
of water to the environment that will reduce available
supplies.
V. REFORM EFFORTS
Because these· problems cannot be answered with tradi-
tional solutions, interest has emerged in determining new
allocative mechanisms to improve the use ofthe water that
currently is available. Public awareness of the inefficien-
cies of the current system have bred a large number of
groups to reform waterpolicy inthe state. 19Mostproposals
seek to achieve consensus between agricultural, urban,
industrial, and environmental interests. Typically, these
consensus approaches call for a mixture ofnew facilities,
conservation ("BestManagement Practices"), waste water
recycling, increased allocations for environmental protec-
tion, and some transfers ofwater.
19. InCalifornia, thesegroups includeTheThree-WayProcess, Califor-
nians for Water, Committee for Water Policy Consensus,Southern
California Water Committee, Farm Water Coalition, and the Bay Delta
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Inmost cases, "transfers" are treated as only partofthe
solution, but water marketing has been rising rapidly to
the front of the list ofalternatives. Some environmental
groups and business groups (such as the Environmental
Defense Fund, the Bay Area Economic Forum, the Bay
AreaCouncil, and the CaliforniaBusinessRoundtable), as
well as some ofthe moreprominent urban water districts
(most noticeably MWD), pushed hard to bring market
forces into water allocation, arguing thatthe resaleofwater
offers the potentialfor greaterefficiency, with the prospect
that nearly all agents can bemade better off(Schmidt and
Cannon 1991, Mitchell 1993).20
These interest groups, were instrumental in obtaining
passageofrecentfederal legislation(H.R. 429), frequently
known as the "Bradley-Miller bill," which has strongly
embraced the market point of view. The bill, signed into
law on October 30, 1992 by President Bush, allows indi-
vidual contractors to sell up to 20 percent oftheir alloca-
tions without approval by water districts, along with other
provisions that.allocate water to environmental purposes,
create a fund for environmental restoration, and shorten
contract periods.
InIsrael some steps toward water reform were begun in
1991. These efforts, however, were halted after the change
in governmentfollowing the 1992 election. Atpresent, no
significant reforms are under consideration.
This lack ofreform efforts in Israel reflects the different
socialand political interests in the two regions. In Califor-
nia, water policy is increasingly addressed as an economic
issue. While arguments still are voiced about the impor-
tance ofmaintaining agriculture in the state, increasingly
the discussion has migrated toward economic issues. Ar-
guments opposed to trading emphasize economic disloca-
tions and third party effects, rather than simply relying on
statements about the importance of maintaining a way of
life for those in the agricultural communities.
In Israel, on the other hand, water remains a strategic
resource and the state is vitally concerned with its alloca-
tion. As discussed by Wolf and Ross (1992), water policy
has been·an important consideration in Israel's dealings
with its neighbors. For example, according to their analy-
sis, watercomplicatesresolution oftheWest Bankdispute.
The West Bank sits above the Mountain· aquifer, and
pumping in thatregion affects supplies to much ofcentral
Israel. Undercurrentpolicies, the Israeli governmentmust
20. The extended drought led to the establishment of an emergency
waterbankinCalifornia in 1991. While not a pure market, the bank did
provide a mechanismto facilitate transfers from agriculturalto urban
users, demonstrating thepotentialfor mutually advantageoustrade. The
water bank, however, is viewed as an emergency measure, and is not
generally perceived as a model for marketing water permanently.
approve all pumping from the West Bank. Clearly, should
that area no longer fall under Israeli jurisdiction, such
control would be jeopardized. Diversions from the Litani
River in southern Lebanon also involve strategic interests.
While such strategic considerations do not preclude
permissionto trade water, they tend to increase the govern-
ment's interest in monitoring the uses of the resource.
Moreover, the kibbutz system has a strong place in the
cultural and political structure oflsrael. Changes in water
policies that might lead to a shift away from agriculture to
industrial uses could pose a threat to that system.
Cost of reforms. The speed with which reforms are
adopted depends critically on the transitional costs that
arise in implementing new policies. Experimentation with
additional transfers under the Bradley-Miller legislation
should provide strong evidence ofthe potential gains and
disruptions that can result from limited resale ofwater. By
allowing resale of water by CVP contractors, the bill
converts water rights into marketable assets, much like
electricity from federal projects. Thus, as with electricity,
the new structure of rights should encourage marginal
transfers among water districts, which may be sufficientto
eliminatethe needfor majornew water storagefacilities. A
key question facing potential reform options is the magni-
tude of disruptions that such reforms might generate.
Would marketforces lead to large shifts in wateruse and to
large changes in prices?
Research on California's water system suggests that the
quantity ofwatertransferred would be relatively small and
the effect on prices to agriculture relatively minor. Howitt,
Watson, and Adams (1980) found estimated elasticities of
demand for agriculture that were well above those ofurban
users. Agricultural demand elasticities for water prices in
the range of $62 to $87 per acre foot (in 1992 dollars)
ranged from - 0.98 to -1.5, and prices below this level
had even larger elasticities. In contrast, urban users were
estimated to have price elasticities close to - 0.4 (Vaux
and Howitt 1984). Given that agriculture currently con-
sumes somewhere in the range of 80 to 85 percent of the
water in California, relatively small percentage reductions
in agricultural use resulting from small increases in aver-
age water prices would relatively quickly satisfy urban
demand: Even a doubling of urban water consumption
wouldreduce agricultural waterby only around afifth from
current levels.
In a simulation model embeddingthese statistics, Vaux
and Howitt (1984) estimated that price effects on agricul-
ture and the magnitude of water transferred in California
would be relatively small. Using updated figures from
Vaux and Howitt's article, Schmidt and Cannon (1991)
found that average agricultural prices might increase as
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than one MAF moved from agriculture to otheruses in the
simulations. Obviously, some farmers receiving water at
well below thatprice wouldface alargerincrease, buteven
in those cases, that suggests that those farmers may have
the potential to profit from selling more water. These
elasticities also are short-run elasticities. Over the longer
run, elasticities are likely to be significantly larger as
farmers install new technologies that save water.
More recent evidence from Howitt (991) provides fur-
ther arguments supporting the low-price impact ofa mar-
ket. According to this research, rice farmers in California
could make the same income from selling water at a price
of$58 per acre foot (including avoiding production costs),
while the break-even price for alfalfa was $114 per acre
foot. Given that these commodities, along with irrigated
pasture, accountfor about athirdofCalifornia's total water
use, those prices put a ceiling on the likely level towhich
prices would rise, since demand by urban areas would be
expected to be satisfied well before all ofthat water would
bepurchased. Moreover, Howittfound thatrelatively little
water was transferred from agricultural producers ofhigh-
value and permanent crops.
Similarly, in Israel, a study by Sadan and Ben-Zvi
(1987) examined the implications ofallowing water to be
traded. They found significant changes occurring in water
use across regions, with less used in the northeastern end
ofthe system, and more used in the south.·Nevertheless,
their study concluded (p.8):
The findings presented demonstrate the low economic
cost of the institutional·alternative relative to that pro-
vided through new resource development. Inthe case of
Israel, the cost of a given quantity of irrigation water
reallocated through institutional change appears to be
only half as expensive as that same quantity provided
throughthe implementationofprojectsfor sewage water
treatment and recycling, flood control, etc.
While allowing trading would result in some realloca-
tion ofresources, and hence some "thirdparty effects" on
agricultural communities, concernabout sucheffects must
beplaced in perspective. Some changes in production and
consumptionpractices wouldoccur, butthe indirecteffects
ofthose actions on others are likely to be small relative to
others that occurregularly in agriculture. For example, the
introduction of mechanical tomato harvesters sharply re-
duced the demand for labor, thus generating third party
effects well in excess of those likely to be generated by
introduction ofa water market (Mitchell 1993).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Israel and Californiashare similaritiesnotonly intheirwa-
terdeliverysystemsandtheirinstitutions,butintheirpublic
attitudes. In both cases, water infrastructures have relied
heavily on public investments, where costs have been
spread widely. Moreover, inboth regions politicalinvolve-
ment has expanded beyond the construction offacilities to
includeclosecontrols on allocation alld use ofthe resource.
Agriculturehas beenthebiggestbeneficiaryofpastinstitu-
tional arrangements, typically receiving the bulk of the
water and paying lower unit prices for that water.
Inboth states, serious reform ofwaterpolicy has proven
very difficult. Among the reasons for this difficulty is the
ingrained public attitude that because water is "impor-
tant" it should be allocated administratively. The public
seems to believe thatthis is "morefair" even though actual
allocations seem to belie this fairness concept. Despite
water's importance in semi-arid areas, policy has optedfor
this "fairness" over efficiency.
We have argued, however, that concerns over fairness
need not preclude trading. As demonstrated in the electric
utility industry, it is possible to achieve social policies
throughdifferentialpricingandthroughgovernmentdevel-
opment ofnew facilities. Yet, efficiency canbe boosted in
that system by allowing trading to take place. Fairness can
be handled by choosing how to allocate the rights to the
resource; efficiency is achieved by granting those rights
holders the right to sell to others.
Examination of Israel and California suggests that the
willingness to experiment with water reforms-specifi-
cally to allow trading-may be increasing in California,
while little momentum is apparent in Israel. In part, this
maybetheresultofthetrade-offthatexistsincontrolofwa-
termarkets. Direct allocation of water gives tremendous
control over development.to governmental agencies. The
costofsuch control, however, is to increase drastically the
efficiency losses and encourage poor resource allocation.
In the case of California, momentum is building for
increased decentralization of control. This momentum
results, in part, from the declining relative economic im-
portanceofthe primary user-agriculture-andthe grow-
ing importance of environmental values. Since the latter
have had· the effect of reducing available supplies and
making new supplies more difficult to acquire, the effi-
ciency costs implicit in administrative control over water
use have risen to the point that other industries and con-
sumers have beenforced to address the issue. Moreover, at
least in California, evidence suggests that the cost andSCHMIDT AND PLAUT/ WATER POLICY IN CALIFORNIA AND ISRAEL 55
disruptions resulting from watertrading are notlikelyto be
that large.
In Israel, while economic costs of administrative wa-
ter allocation also are high, strategic concerns and the
political strength of the agricultural sector continue to
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